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ABSTRACT
Botnets have evolved to become one of the most serious threats to the Internet and there is
substantial research on both botnets and botnet detection techniques. This survey reviewed the
history of botnets and botnet detection techniques. The survey showed traditional botnet
detection techniques rely on passive techniques, primarily honeypots, and that honeypots are not
effective at detecting peer-to-peer and other decentralized botnets. Furthermore, the detection
techniques aimed at decentralized and peer-to-peer botnets focus on detecting communications
between the infected bots. Recent research has shown hierarchical clustering of flow data and
machine learning are effective techniques for detecting botnet peer-to-peer traffic.
Keywords: botnet, botnet detection, distributed denial of service, malware
1. INTRODUCTION
The term ‘botnet’ is now associated with
cybercrime and hacking (Alhomoud, Awan,
Disso, & Younas, 2013). However, botnets
were originally developed to assist with the
administration of Internet Relay Chat (IRC)
Servers (Cooke et al., 2005). As the popularity
of IRC expanded, the IRC server
administrators developed software to perform
automated functions to assist with the
administration of the IRC Servers (Cooke et
al., 2005). The computers that operated the
software and performed the automated
functions were referred to as robot computers
and eventually as bots (Dittrich, 2012). The
Eggdrop IRC bot was the first IRC Bot,
developed in 1993 by Jeff Fisher to assist with
the administration of IRC channels and which
is still in use today (Alhomoud et al., 2013;
Cooke et al., 2005). Eventually, a network of
bots was developed under the direction of IRC
administrators and became known as a botnet
(Dittrich, 2012). IRC administrators were able
to send a single command from their computer
and the botnet would execute that command
on all the IRC Servers. Figure 1 shows a
typical network configuration of an IRC
botnet. Nefarious individuals realized the
potential of botnets for unethical purposes and
the botnets began to infect IRC users’
computers without the users’ knowledge and
use those computers without the users’ consent
(Cao & Qiu, 2013; Cooke et al, 2005).
A Computer Emergency Response Team,
Coordination Center (CERT/CC) advisory
published on March 11, 2003, CERT/CC
Advisory CA-2003-08, warned against the GT-
bot and sdbot utilizing IRC to remotely
control compromised systems (Householder &
Danyliw, 2003). Householder and Danyliw
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(2003) also highlighted the growing size of
botnets, with reports of GT-bot botnets in
excess of 140,000 bots and the sdbot with over
7000 compromised systems. Householder and
Danyliw also warned of the botnets’ ability to
launch distributed denial of service attacks
with TDP, UDP, and ICMP packets.
Figure 1. An IRC Botnet diagram showing the individual connections between each “bot” and the
command and control server.
The size and scope of botnets continued to
rise at an alarming rate and in February 2010,
Spanish authorities and the FBI dismantled
the Mariposa botnet, which consisted of over
12 million compromised computers (Roscini,
2014). Only 2 years after the takedown of the
Mariposa botnet, another botnet, the Metulji
botnet, was dismantled by the FBI and
consisted of over 20 million compromised
computers (Ventre, 2013). In 2013, Rossow
and Dietrich considered botnets to be one of
the Internet’s most serious threats and Awan
et al. (2013) believed botnets are a priority for
many countries’ cyber defenses.
There has been considerable research into
botnets and botnet detection techniques, but
botnets are constantly evolving to stay ahead
of the latest detection techniques (Brezo,
Santos, Bringas, & Val, 2011; Feily,
Shahrestani, & Ramadass, 2009; Hasan,
Awadi, & Belaton, 2013; Zeng, 2012; Zhang,
2012). This survey analyzed the history and
evolution of botnet detection as botnets
changed from a centralized command and
control structure to a decentralized peer-to-
peer control structure. When early research on
botnet detection focused on the use of passive
honeypots and detection techniques aimed at
detecting botnet command and control
communications in centralized botnets,
Botmasters began to use peer-to-peer and
decentralized communications (Feily et al.,
2009; Hasan, Awadi, & Belaton, 2013; Zeng,
2012; Zhang, 2012). Botnet detection
techniques were then developed to identify
communications between infected computers
within the decentralized botnets and
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Botmasters responded with the use of
obfuscated and encrypted communications
(Brezo, Santos, Bringas, & Val, 2011; Feily et
al., 2009; Gu, Porras, Yegneswaran, Fong, &
Lee, 2007; Zeng, 2012; Zhang, 2012).
There have been several previous surveys
of botnet detection techniques, but most are
dated prior to 2009 and do not include botnet
detection techniques aimed at decentralized or
encrypted botnets (Feily et al., 2009; Bailey,
Cooke, Jahanian, Yunjing, & Karir, 2009; Zhu,
Lu, Chen, Fu, Roberts, & Han, 2008). Silva,
Silva, Pinto and Salles (2013) conducted a
survey of Botnets that included peer to peer,
decentralized, and encrypted botnets. Silva et
al. included a history of botnets and a survey
of different botnet detection techniques, as well
as a sample of techniques for botnet defense.
What separates this survey from previous
work is the comparison of botnet detection
techniques by command and control
infrastructure. To the best of our knowledge,
previous research has not yet clearly identified
which detection techniques are effective against
which types of command and control
infrastructure. This survey provides a
comprehensive review of botnet detection
techniques and provides tables for quick review
of which techniques are effective against which
command and control infrastructures.
2. EARLY BOTNET
DETECTION (2005-2010)
The Honeynet project was a pioneer in botnet
detection (Feily et al., 2009). The Honeynet
project began in 1999 as an information
mailing list for information security
professionals and was established as a non-
profit information security research
organization with the mission to learn about
computer and network attacks in 2000
(Spitzner, 2003). Spitzner (2003) defined a
honeynet as a network of computers placed on
the Internet with the intention of capturing
unauthorized activity directed at the
computers. The purpose of a honeynet is to
monitor network activity after malicious
software is installed on the honeynet’s
computers and learn how the malicious
software operates, with the goal of capturing
new and unknown attacks and malicious
software (Spitzner, 2003). In a 2009 survey of
botnet detection techniques, Feily et al. (2009)
found a vast majority of the botnet detection
techniques rely heavily on honeynets because
honeynets are simple to operate and are
passive to the botnet, so no interaction is
required with the botmaster or command and
control server by the researcher. The honeynet
receives the instructions or commands from the
botnet operator but does not itself respond or
execute the commands (Spitzner, 2003).
In July 2005, Cooke, Jahanian, and
McPherson proposed monitoring transmission
control protocol (TCP) port 6667 on live
networks for IRC botnet command and control
traffic as a possible botnet detection technique.
TCP port 6667 is the default IRC port, but
Cooke et al. recognized the default port is
easily changed to non-standard ports, so the
detection technique of monitoring networks for
IRC traffic on TCP 6667 was not
recommended. Cooke et al. proposed a second
botnet detection technique utilizing a honeypot
and capturing traffic between the honeypot
and the IRC botnet command and control
server. The captured traffic was then analyzed
to develop signatures of botnet traffic (Cooke
et al, 2005). Cooke et al. determined there
were no connection-based variables that would
be useful in detecting botnets via monitoring
network traffic for command and control
traffic. The botnets’ ability to modify the
mode or behavior of communications can easily
defeat detection techniques based on command
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and control traffic analysis (Cooke et al.,
2005).
Although Cooke et al. (2005) determined
monitoring for command and control traffic
was not effective, Gu et al. (2007) develop
BotHunter, to detect inbound command and
control traffic with bots inside a local area
network. Gu et al. developed two plugins and
one ruleset for the open source, intrusion
detection system, Snort (Cisco, 2014). For
inbound traffic detection, Gu et al. (2007)
developed the Snort plugin, Statistical Scan
Anomaly Detection (SCADE) which monitors
24 TCP and 4 UDP inbound ports for possible
command and control traffic associated with
botnet malware. SCADE also monitors
outbound traffic for hosts that scan a large
number of external IP addresses or have high
number of failed external connections.
The second Snort (Cisco, 2014) plugin
developed by Gu et al. (2007) Statistical
Payload Anomaly Detection Engine (SLADE)
attempts to detect malicious payloads through
packet inspection of all inbound traffic.
SLADE utilizes anomaly detection to
determine if payloads are suspicious based on
the payloads standard deviation from test
payloads of normal Internet traffic (Gu et al.,
2007). The problem with deep packet
inspection is the large overhead associated with
inspecting voluminous amounts of traffic in
large networks (Zhang, 2012). Gu et al. (2007)
also developed four rulesets for Snort (Cisco,
2014) to monitor 1383 heuristics of known
botnets and malware. BotHunter’s final phase
of detection is a correlation matrix that weighs
each Snort alert and applies a coefficient based
on the type of alert to determine if a host is
infected (Gu et al., 2007).
Gu, Zhang, and Lee (2008) built upon
BotHunter to develop BotSniffer, a system
designed to detect botnet command and
control traffic through anomaly detection.
BotSniffer is limited to detecting IRC and
HTTP botnets that use a centralized command
and control server, but no prior knowledge of a
botnet’s signature is required to detect hosts
within a local area network (Gu, Zhang, et al.,
2008). In both IRC and HTTP botnets, Gu,
Zhang, et al. recognized that the bots must
make connections to the command and control
server to obtain commands and then the bots
will have similar activity based on the
commands. Based on research conducted by
Zhuge, Holz, Han, Guo, & Zou (2007), Gu and
his associates developed BotSniffer to recognize
similar behavior by hosts after communicating
with a possible command and control server
located at the same IP address. Zhuge et al.
(2007) had determined that over 28% IRC
botnet commands are for spreading malware
and 25% of IRC commands are for distributed
denial of service attacks. Based on these
statistics, Gu, Zhang et al. (2008) developed
anomaly based algorithms to detect command
and control traffic, as well as network
scanning, with the open source intrusion
detection system, Snort (Cisco, 2014). Utilizing
previously captured network traffic with
known botnet infections, Gu, Zhang et al.
(2008) successfully tested BotSniffer and
detected 100% of IRC botnet command and
control traffic with a false positive rate of
0.16%.
Research by Karasaridis, Rexford, and
Hoeflin (2007) in anomaly-based detection
techniques demonstrated the ability to
calculate the size of botnets as well as identify
command and control servers by analyzing
flow data from the transport layer in large-
scale networks. However, this technique was
only tested against IRC based botnets utilizing
a centralized command and control server
(Karasaridis et al., 2007). Karasaridis et al.
recommended additional research in the
detection of peer-to-peer and HTTP based
botnets.
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With the introduction of botnets
communicating via peer to peer networks, Gu,
Perdisci et al. (2008) developed BotMiner as a
botnet detection technique that is effective
against any botnet command and control
protocol or structure, including peer to peer.
Figure 2 shows a typical peer to peer botnet
infrastructure without a central command and
control server.  BotMiner detects botnets by
clustering hosts based on similar traffic and
malicious activities (Gu, Perdisci et al., 2008).
Gu, Perdisci et al.’s research focused on the
botnet communications since botnets much
communicate with a command and control
server of with other bots to receive commands
such as when to scan or launch attacks.  In
order for the bots to function as a botnet, the
bots must receive the same commands;
therefore the researchers believed the same
botnet would have similar traffic and malicious
activities (Gu, Perdisci et al., 2008). Based on
the similar traffic and activities, BotMiner
clusters similar communication traffic into C-
plane traffic and like malicious activities into
A-plane traffic (Gu, Perdisci et al., 2008). Gu,
Perdisci et al. then detected botnets by
correlating the A-plane and C-plane traffic.
To cluster communications within the C-
plane traffic, Gu, Perdisci, et al. (2008)
monitored TCP and UDP network flow data
and recorded IP addresses, network ports time
and duration of the traffic, and the number of
packets and bytes transferred in each direction.
Gu, Perdisci et al. used Snort (Cisco, 2014) to
capture A-plane traffic based on malicious
activities, scanning, spam, and binary
downloads. The C-plane clusters were then
correlated with the A-plane clusters to identify
hosts that are part of a botnet (Gu, Perdisci et
al., 2008).
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Figure 2. Peer to peer botnet showing the decentralized infrastructure and lack of a
command and control server. The Botmaster is able to communicate directly with a
bot and the commands are passed between the bots.
Wang and Yu (2009) developed a botnet
detection technique aimed at detecting
command and control communications of
centralized botnets, irrespective of the
particular botnet. Wang and Yu based their
detection technique on the timing and
uniformity of botnet communications; Wang
and Yu’s technique used only the packet size
and timing interval between arriving packets
as variables to determine if network traffic was
botnet command and control communications.
Experimental results showed the technique to
be effective for detecting command and control
traffic of four different botnet types. However,
the technique is only effective against botnets
with a centralized command and control
structure (Wang & Yu, 2009).
Using structured overlay networks for
communication, Nagaraja, Mittal, Hong,
Caesar and Borisov (2010) developed BotGrep,
a botnet detection technique focused on peer-
to-peer botnets. Nagaraja et al. developed an
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
A Survey of Botnet Detection Techniques by Command ... JDFSL V10N1
© 2015 ADFSL Page 13
algorithm that isolates peer-to-peer
communication based on the pairing of nodes
that communicate with each other. BotGrep
then utilizes graph analysis to identify botnet
hosts. Although BotGrep is not affected by
botnets that vary ports or use encryption,
BotGrep does require a seeding of botnet
information to be effective; therefore, the
researchers recommend operating a honeynet
to capture botnet intelligence that can be used
by BotGrep to identify the rest of the botnet
(Nagaraja et al., 2010).
Prior detection techniques relied on either
host level detection or network level detection.
Hoever, Zeng, Hu and Shin (2010) developed a
botnet detection technique that incorporates
both host level detection and network level
detection. Zeng et al. believed that by
combining the host and network level
detections and correlating the alerts, their
technique would increase the rate of detection
and overcome the limitation of each technique
alone. Zeng et al. used registry changes, file
system modifications and network stack
changes to alert for possible botnet malware
activity on host detections and utilized netflow
data for network level detection but avoided
full packet inspection, which ensures privacy
for network users. The researchers successfully
tested the combined host and network
detection technique. Such may very well be the
first combined host and network level
detection technique developed. Further, Zeng
et al. stated that their combined host detection
technique was effective against IRC, peer-to-
peer, and HTTP botnets, but noted that the
technique is limited by the scalability. Zeng et
al. recognized that the host level detection
technique requires installation on all hosts
within an organization and may only be
accomplished in enterprise networks.
Table 1 summarizes early botnet detection
techniques based on the techniques ability to
detect different types of botnet infrastructure.
Table 1 also provides an indirect timeline of
botnet infrastructures and communications.
While early botnets used IRC exclusively, the
introduction of HTTP and P2P
communications is evident.
Table 1
Early Botnet Detection Techniques
Researchers IRC HTTP P2P
Cooke et al. (2005) X
Gu et al. (2007) X
Karasaridis, Rexford, and Hoeflin (2007) X
Gu, Zhang, and Lee (2008) X X
Gu, Perdisci et al. (2008) X X X
Wang and Yu (2009) X X
Nagaraja, Mittal, Hong, Caesar and Borisov (2010) X
Zeng, Hu and Shin (2010) X X X
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3. MODERN BOTNET
RESEARCH (2011-14)
With the increase in peer-to-peer and
decentralized botnets a majority of modern
research has focused on detecting peer-to-peer
and decentralized botnets, in particular, the
communications between bots within the
botnet. Francois, Wang, State and Engel
(2011) developed BotTrack and overcome the
limitations of forensic analysis when examining
large datasets of NetFlow data to detect peer-
to-peer botnet communications. Similar to
BotGrep (Nagaraja et al., 2010), Francois et
al. developed BotTrack to identify peer-to-peer
connections between hosts and identify botnet
hosts utilizing an algorithm and graph
analysis. Building on BotTrack, Francois,
Wang, Bronzi, State and Engel (2011) used
Hadoop (Hadoop, 2013), an open source form
of distributed computing based on Google’s
MapReduce (Dean & Ghemawat, 2004) to
develop BotCloud to efficiently analyze
NetFlow data. BotCloud showed improved
detection rates when prior information about
botnets is developed with a honeypot (Francois
et al., 2011). Furthermore, BotCloud’s use of
Hadoop (2013) increased the efficiency and
speed of botnet detection (Francois et al.,
2011).
Zhang, Perdisci, Lee, Sarfraz and Luo
(2011) developed a botnet detection technique
to detect botnet peer-to-peer communications
utilizing statistical fingerprints of peer-to-peer
traffic. Peer-to-peer botnets have an advantage
over IRC or HTTP protocol botnets because
the former do not have a centralized command
and control server and single point of failure
(Zhang et al., 2011). The lack of a centralized
command and control server make peer-to-peer
botnets more resilient and more difficult to
disable (Zhang et al., 2011). Zhang et al.’s
peer-to-peer detection technique was focused
on local area networks (LANS) and enterprise
wide area networks (WANS); to detect peer-to-
peer botnets. Zhang et al.’s technique first
detects all peer-to-peer traffic and hosts and
then develops signatures for different
applications. Based on the signatures, Zhang et
al. were able to differentiate legitimate peer-to-
peer traffic from botnet peer-to-peer traffic. To
develop the signatures of peer-to-peer traffic,
Zhang et al. used the length of time a peer-to-
peer program is operating because botnets run
as long as possible and whenever a computer is
turned on, while legitimate peer-to-peer
programs are often started and stopped by the
user. Based on the length of time a peer-to-
peer program is active, Zhang et al. filtered out
peer-to-peer hosts with short active times.
After filtering the peer-to-peer traffic based
on length of active peer-to-peer traffic Zhang
et al. (2011) further differentiated the traffic
based on IP addresses contacted by peer-to-
peer hosts. Since peer-to-peer botnet hosts
within the same LAN/WAN will often
communicate with the same IP addresses and
with other bots within the LAN/WAN, the
researchers were able to filter out peer-to-peer
hosts that did not communicate with any IP
addresses that were not contacted by other
peer-to-peer hosts (Zhang et al., 2011). The
final filter Zhang et al. applied was based on
the connection status of the traffic. If a peer-
to-peer host had completed an outgoing three
way handshake on a TCP connection or a
UDP connection with a request and response
packet, the traffic is kept and all other traffic
is filtered out (Zhang et al., 2011). Zhang et al.
based this filter on their findings that peer-to-
peer nodes function as both a server and a
client, and must accept connections from other
hosts in the network and initiate connections
with the same hosts. After this traffic filtering
was complete, Zhang et al. attempted to
identify peer-to-peer botnet hosts.
Zhang et al.’s final action to identify peer-
to-peer botnet hosts involved differentiating
between legitimate peer-to-peer traffic and
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botnet peer-to-peer traffic. To determine this,
Zhang et al. analyzed the traffic for hosts that
ran the same protocol and communicated with
a high percentage of the same IP addresses. As
stated earlier, bots of the same peer-to-peer
botnet will communicate with each other and
share IP destinations of other bots within the
botnet. Furthermore, Zhang et al.’s research
showed bots of the same botnet use the same
peer-to-peer protocol. Based on these filters
and detection techniques, Zhang et al. were
able to detect 100% of the peer-to-peer bots
within captured network traffic with only a
0.2% false positive rate.
As botnets began to use encrypted
communications, Barthakur, Dahal and Ghose
(2012) developed a procedure for detecting
encrypted peer-to-peer botnet communications.
Barthakur et al. used Support Vector
Machines to analysis network traffic and
classify botnet communications based on
patterns and statistical differences between
peer-to-peer botnet communications and
normal web traffic. Barthakur et al. recognized
botnet communications use many random
ports and attempt to keep packet sizes to a
minimum, which is the opposite of legitimate
peer-to-peer to traffic. Based on these facts,
Support Vector Machines were able to analyze
patterns of peer-to-peer traffic and successfully
identify botnet communications (Barhakur et
al., 2012).
Han, Chen, Xu and Liang (2012) proposed
a botnet detection and suppression system
called Garlic. Han et al. believed Botmasters
attempted to keep botnets as small possible to
avoid detection and allow the Botmaster to
easily change the botnet’s command and
control server. Han et al. stated the botnet
suppression system, Garlic, was capable of
automatically detecting and suppressing
botnets. Han et al.’s Garlic suppression system
relied on terminal nodes distributed
throughout a network and the nodes
collaborated with each other to detect patterns
and alerts based on rules. Han et al. also
observed that Garlic would regenerate rules
based on feedback from the alerts and
redistributed updated rules to the terminal
nodes. During experimental testing, Han et al.
were able to detect all 20 bots within 45
minutes; however, they only experimented with
IRC botnets operating on TCP ports 6660-
6669 (including IRC port 6667), as well as
HTTP botnets operating on port 80. Han et al.
did not test peer-to-peer botnet nor did they
provide any research on peer-to-peer botnets
within their study.
Increasingly, botnets expand through drive
by download attacks.  In response, Zhang
(2012) developed a new botnet detection
technique to identify drive by download
attacks and detect botnets in the infection
stage. Zhang recognized that many botnets use
drive by downloads to infect new bots and by
preventing the initial infection the size and
scope of botnets could be greatly diminished.
To identify drive by download techniques,
Zhang collected HTTP traces from honeypots
and whenever exploits were detected, the
honeypots used a dynamic WebCrawler to
record the URLs and IP addresses of the
domains. Zhang then clustered groups of
hostnames that share IP addresses. By
clustering the hostnames based on shared IP
addresses, Zhang was able to defeat the
botnets that use fast flux network changes to
command control server domain names and IP
addresses. Fast flux networks use numerous IP
addresses for one domain name and repeatedly
update the DNS records for the domain name
to different IP addresses to avoid detection
(Caglayan, Toothaker, Drapaeau, & Burke,
2010).
Furthermore, Zhang (2012) also developed
a system to increase the scalability of botnet
detection systems. Zhang’s system improved
upon current detection systems by reducing
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the amount of packets requiring deep packet
inspection; Zhang accomplished this by
developing a three-step process that captures
network flows, correlated the network flows
and detected botnets through fine grain
analysis. Rather than use deep packet
inspection, Zhang’s system used network flow
information and packet header information,
which allowed for deployments in larger
networks and the ability to inspect traffic for
botnet command and control traffic.
Zhang (2012) also developed a flow-capture
process that monitors the edge of large
networks and gathers netflow data on possible
botnet traffic. The netflow data is then
assembled and passed to the flow-correlation
module. Zhang used a process developed in
BotMiner called C-flow (Gu et al., 2008) to
build the flow-correlation module. However,
Zhang used a more efficient process for
clustering netflows to allow for larger traffic
volumes and employed correlation to identify
hosts that had similar persistent
communications. In Zhang’s final process, a
fine-grained detector utilizes previous detection
techniques based on deep packet inspection.
Zhang used both BotMiner and BotSniffer to
inspect the traffic identified as possible botnet
traffic by the flow-capture and flow-correlation
modules and was able to achieve 100%
detection rate when using cross correlation of
flows and the B-sampling algorithm. For
sampling rates above 0.05%, Zhang obtained
false positive rates between 0.3% and 8%, as
the sampling rate increased. However, when
Zhang used both flow-correlation and a fine-
grain detector, Zhang was able to detect 100%
of botnets with no false positives for sampling
rates above 0.05%.
Ilavarasan and Muthumanickam (2012)
combined host level detection and network
level analysis to overcome the limitations of
each separately. The host level detection
utilized registry analysis and file monitoring to
detect changes related malware associated with
botnets (Ilavarasan & Muthumanickam, 2012).
Ilavarasan and Muthumanickam analyzed
network traffic to identify peer-to-peer traffic
and cluster similar traffic based on activity and
contacted IP addresses. The final process in
Ilavarasan’s and Muthumanickam’s detection
technique was a correlation engine that
combined the network analysis with the host
level detection to alert for possible botnet
infections.
Zeng (2012) developed a three-pronged
approach to identify and mitigate the effects of
botnets. Zeng proposed utilizing end host
containment of infected bots, network edge
detection of botnets, and measuring of network
components at the infrastructure level for large
botnet detection.  Zeng also presented a proof
of concept for future botnets utilizing mobile
smart phones and SMS messages for command
and control of a botnet. Zeng discussed the
history of botnets and botnet detection
techniques and highlighted the limitations of
the current strategies to detect botnets. Most
notably, the researcher discussed the rapidly
changing communication methods for botnets,
including peer-to-peer communications, and
the limitations of current HTTP and IRC
detection techniques (Zeng, 2012).
Zeng’s (2012) research on end-host botnet
detection incorporated previous techniques for
containment of fast spreading network worms
with new behavior analysis of all applications
on the computer. The behavior analysis
examined the actions of applications at the
registry, file system and network stack, and
was successful at identifying suspicious actions,
while allowing legitimate applications (Zeng,
2012). Furthermore, the rate of false positives
was greatly reduced when compared to existing
detection techniques (Zeng, 2012)
Zeng (2012) also combined the edge
network detection technique with the host-
based detection to increase the effectiveness of
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botnet detection. The edge network detection
utilizes NetFlow data captured from routers
and does not access the packet payload,
ensuring privacy for legitimate traffic (Zeng,
2012). Zeng identified 17 traits of botnets that
he used to determine if network traffic was
suspicious and related to botnets. The 17 traits
identified by Zeng for botnet traffic include the
following network flow features: mean,
variance, skewness, and kurtosis for duration;
mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis for
total bytes; mean, variance, skewness, and
kurtosis for number of packets; and the
number of TCP flows, UDP flows, SMTP
flows, unique IPs contacted, and number of
suspicious ports.
The final portion of Zeng’s (2012)
technique was botnet detection at the
infrastructure level. Zeng chose to focus on
large peer-to-peer botnets and evaluate the
feasibility of detecting peer-to-peer botnets at
the Internet infrastructure level. Zeng
concluded that host-based techniques for
botnet detection are not reliable and network
edge detection is necessary to detect botnets.
Furthermore, the behavior analysis and
NetFlow analysis Zeng developed is
independent of the type of botnet and
command and control communication a botnet
utilizes, thus it greatly increases the chances of
botnet detection.
Bilge, Balzarotti, Robertson, Kirda, and
Kruegel (2012) developed Disclosure, a botnet
detection system to detect command and
control servers, rather than individual bots.
Using Netflow data, Disclosure distinguishes
between botnet command and control server
traffic, and benign server traffic through the
flow size between a server and client.  Bilge et
al. stated command and control server traffic
does not fluctuate significantly due to the
limited number of commands used by the
botnet.  Furthermore, the objective of the
botnet is to stay undetected, so the botnet
sends the shortest flow of data possible.
Similar to anomaly based IDS, Disclosure
performed better when larger amounts of
benign flow data were analyzed.  This enabled
Disclosure to distinguish between benign server
traffic and command and control server traffic
(Bilge et al., 2012).  During evaluation, Bilge
et al. tried numerous settings within Disclosure
and the results showed as the detection rate
increased, so did the false positive rate.
Using the different behaviors of botnets, Li,
Xie, Luo and Zhu (2013) developed Snort rules
to detect botnet activity.  Specifically, Li, Xie,
et al. determined there were six behaviors
unique to botnets: abnormal access to backup
DNS servers, large number of domain name
requests to a single domain, accessing fast flux
networks, downloading malware, ingress and
egress scanning, and null TCP connections.
Based on these behaviors, Li, Xie et al.
developed Snort rules to detect each behavior.
Every Snort alert was tracked in an alert
matrix and correlated against the six known
botnet behaviors to identify botnet activity
(Li, Xie et al., 2013). Li, Xie et al. were
successful at identifying 20 known botnets with
detection rates between 74% and 94% with no
false positives. Lie et al. also test the Snort
(Cisco, 2014) rules against 8 unknown botnets
and detected between 56% and 73% of
unknown botnets with zero false positives. Lie,
Xie et al. explain unknown botnets as botnets
that the malicious behavior of the botnet is
unknown, not the actual malware.
Rossow and Dietrich (2013) recognized
that existing intrusion detection systems are
not capable of detecting all encrypted
command and control traffic based on payload
signatures. The payload-based signatures used
by intrusion detection systems are easily
defeated by encrypted or obfuscated command
and control traffic because botnets employ
defense measures against payload signature
recognition, such as dynamic encryption keys,
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data payloads encrypted with the XOR cipher,
and varying the length of messages (Rossow &
Dietrich, 2013). To counter the defenses
employed by botnets, Rossow and Dietrich
developed Provex, a Network Intrusion
Detection system (NIDS), which detects
encrypted botnet communications and was
designed to learn from previously decrypted
botnet communications and identify
characteristic bytes within encrypted traffic.
Then Provex “derives probabilistic vectorized
signatures that can be used to verify if
decrypted packets stem from a certain malware
family’s C&C” (Rossow & Dietrich, 2013, p. 6).
Although Provex must decrypt network traffic
and match signatures to the decrypted packets,
Rossow and Dietrich were able to operate
Provex at nearly 1Gbit/s of network traffic
without packet loss and believed that Provex
would handle network speeds of up to
10Gbit/s. In laboratory testing, Provex
detected all true positive encrypted
communications 100% of the time for six
botnet variants and 78%, 81.5%, 87%, and
97% for four botnets, with only three false
positive results (Rossow & Dietrich, 2013).
Using 1317 distinct malware samples from
8 malware families that communicate via P2P,
Kheir and Wolley (2013) developed a malware
classifier as part of their botnet detection
technique. Kheir and Wolley recognized that
P2P botnet traffic can be distinguished by
three characteristics, time, space, and flow size.
Using these characteristics, Kheir and Wolley
used machine learning to differentiate P2P
botnet traffic from benign P2P traffic. There
testing showed P2P botnet traffic can be
distinguished from benign P2P traffic with low
false positive rates.
Garant and Lu (2013) reviewed existing
botnet detection techniques and determined
such were ineffective against unknown botnets
as well as botnets that employ encrypted
communications. Grant and Lu developed the
Weasel botnet that employs fully encrypted
communications to test a new detection
technique that is capable of detecting
encrypted botnet communications. Garant and
Lu and identified six features to identify the
encrypted botnet communications: length in
bytes, packet count, protocol, flow duration,
flow direction, and TCP flags. To develop the
signature of botnet communications utilizing
the six features, Garant and Lu used a decision
tree classification with the C4.5 and Weka’s
J48 algorithms; the researchers successfully
detected over 90% of encrypted botnet
communications with a false positive rate of
9.9% and false negative rate of 10.5%.
Zhang, Perdisci, Lee, Luo, & Sarfraz (2014)
built upon their previous work in 2011 to
increase efficiency, reduce storage costs, and
boost the system scalability. Zhang et al.
eliminated the analysis of failed network
connections for P2P traffic as an indicator of
P2P botnet traffic and relied entirely on
netflow analysis for botnet detection. Through
hierarchical clustering of P2P flows, Zhang et
al. were able to distinguish legitimate P2P
traffic from botnet P2P traffic with 100% true
positive detection rate and 0.2% false positive
detection rate.
Using machine learning, Haddadi, Morgan,
Filho, & Zincir-Heywood (2014) developed a
botnet detection technique for HTTP botnets.
Haddadi et al. used C4.5 and Naïve Bayes
machine learning classifiers to analyze netflow
data and detect HTTP botnet traffic. Since the
detection technique only relies on netflow data,
the technique is not affected by encrypted
botnet traffic. The detection technique was
tested against the Zeus botnet and the Citadel
botnet. Haddadi et al. tested the detection
technique with netflows containing all captured
traffic and with filtered netflows of only HTTP
traffic. The detection results with all traffic
ranged between 7% and 88% for true positive
detections and 1% to 16% for false positive
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detections. When the HTTP filter was applied,
Haddadi et al. increased the true positive
detection rate to 85% and 97% for Zeus and
Citadel traffic respectively. Furthermore, the
false positive detection rates decreased to 14%
and 3%.
4. COMPARISON OF
BOTNET DETECTION
TECHNIQUES BY
INFRASTRUCTURE
This section provides a comparison of botnet
detection techniques.  We have compared the
techniques based on the techniques ability to
detect IRC, HTTP, and P2P based botnets
and whether the technique is effective against
encrypted botnet communications. Table 2
provides a summary of the different techniques
detection ability.
Table 2 also shows the change in detection
techniques as botnets changed communication
methods and infrastructures. Between 2005
and 2007 researchers focused IRC and HTTP
botnets that use a centralized command and
control server. Then in 2008 detection
techniques began to include P2P
communication and decentralized
infrastructures. Finally, in 2012 detection
techniques began to include the ability to
detect encrypted communications.
Previous botnet detection techniques have
reported varied success rates for botnet
detection and rates of false positive detections.
In 2007 and 2008 true positive detection rates
ranged between 95% and 96.8%, while false
positive detection rates were between 0.049%
and 0.0003%. (Gu et al., 2007; Gu, Perdisci,
et al., 2008). Between 2009 and 2014 true
positive detection rates increased to between
99% and 100%, however false positive
detection rates also increased to a range of
0.0056% and 0.2%  (Barthakur et al., 2012;
Francois et al., 2011; Haddadi et al., 2014;
Wang and Yu, 2009; Zeng et al., 2010; Zhang
et al., 2011, Zhang et al., 2014). This survey
showed that while true positive detection rates
have increased, so have false positive detection
rates. The one exception to these results are
from Haddadi et al. (2014), were the true
positive detection rates decreased. Table 3
shows the true detection rates and false
positive detection rates for nine studies
reviewed as part of this survey that provided
detection rates.
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Table 2
Detection Capabilities of Different Botnet Detection Techniques
Researchers IRC HTTP P2P Encrypted
Cooke, Jahanian and McPherson (2005) X
Gu, Porras and Yegneswaran (2007) X
Karasaridis, Rexford, and Hoeflin (2007) X
Gu, Zhang, and Lee (2008) X X
Gu, Perdisci et al. (2008) X X X
Wang and Yu (2009) X X
Nagaraja, Mittal, Hong, Caesar and Borisov (2010) X
Zeng, Hu and Shin (2010) X X X
Francois, Wang, Bronzi, State and Engel (2011) X
Zhang, Perdisci, Lee, Sarfraz and Luo (2011) X
Barthakur, Dahal and Ghose (2012) X X X
Han, Chen, Xu and Liang (2012) X X
Zhang (2012) X X X
Ilavarasan and Muthumanickam (2012) X
Zeng (2012) X X X X
Li, Xie, Luo and Zhu (2013) X X X X
Rossow and Dietrich (2013) X X X X
Garant and Lu (2013) X X
Zhang et al. (2014) X X
Haddadi et al. (2014) X X
Table 3
Botnet Detection Rates
Researchers True Positive Rate False Positive Rate
Gu et al. (2007) 95.1% 0.049%
Gu, Perdisci et al. (2008) 96.83% 0.0003%
Wang and Yu (2009) 100% 0.0056%
Zeng et al. (2010) 99.99% 0.16%
Francois et al. (2011) 99% 0.1%
Zhang et al. (2011) 100% 0.2%
Barthakur et al. (2012) 99.01% 0.11%
Zhang et al. (2014) 100% 0.2%
Haddadi et al. (2014) Citadel 97% 3%
Haddadi et al. (2014) Zeus 85% 14%
Note: Gu, Perdisci et al. (2008) true detection rate is an average of 8 tests
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An analysis of the botnet detection
techniques reviewed in the survey showed
that techniques which used machine learning
and hierarchical clustering of flow data were
more effective than techniques based on deep
packet analysis or fingerprint analysis. The
same was true for the efficiency and
scalability of the techniques. Relying solely
on Netflow data allows the techniques to
process large data sets, while maintaining
high true positive detection rates and low
false positive rates.
5. CONCLUSION
This survey examined the existing research
on botnet detection and distributed denial of
service attacks in a chronological order.
Literature was reviewed from numerous
sources including scholarly journals,
conference papers, books, dissertations, and
government documents. The literature was
obtained from numerous online databases
including, ProQuest, IEEE Computer Society
Digital Library, ACM Digital Library,
Google Scholar, and the IEEE Xplore Digital
Library. The keywords used in the search
included botnet, distributed denial of service,
malware, denial of service, botnet detection,
botnet identification, and proactive botnet.
The review showed that botnets and botnet
detection techniques are constantly evolving
as Botmasters update and modify botnets to
stay ahead of the latest botnet detection
techniques (Alhomoud et al., 2013; Garant &
Lu, 2013; Zargar, Joshi, & Tipper, 2013).
Although IRC and HTTP botnets are still
active, most new botnets use a decentralized
infrastructure to avoid a single point of
failure (Garant & Lu, 2013; Gu et al., 2009).
Furthermore, a majority of botnets now
utilize encrypted communications to avoid
detection (Garant & Lu, 2013; Gu et al.,
2009; Li, Xie et al., 2013; Rossow & Dietrich,
2013). Therefore, modern botnet detection
techniques attempt to detect botnet
command and control communications
within network traffic through hierarchical
clustering of flow data (Haddadi et al., 2014;
Kheir & Wolley, 2013; Zhang et al., 2014).
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